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Satellite Workshop
Change and Change-Makers
New Perspectives on the Problem of Persistence
21 - 22 September 2018
University of Cologne
GAP Conference
Change and Change-Makers
New Perspectives on the Problem of Persistence
21 - 22 September 2018
University of Cologne
GAP Conference
Program
Friday, 21. September 2018
|
10:15 - 11:15
11:30 - 12:30 14:00 - 15:00 15:15 - 16:15 16:45 - 17:45 18:00 - 19:00 |
Florian Fischer (Siegen) - What are Change-Makers and Why Do We Need Them
Anna Marmodoro (Oxford/Durham) and Andrea Roselli (Durham) - Time after Change lunch break John Pemberton (LSE) - Changing Anne Sophie Meincke (Exeter) - Taking Process Seriously: Lessons for (Powerful) Persistence Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (Lund) - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation, Constitution, and Persistence Ludger Jansen (Bochum) - Substrates of Change |
Saturday, 22. September 2018
|
10:15 - 11:15
11:30 - 12:30 14:00 - 15:00 15:15 - 16:15 16:45 - 17:45 18:00 - 19:00 |
Petter Sandstad (Rostock) - Form, Stability-Makers, and Homeostasis
Matteo Benocci (Reading) - Existential Fragility and Stage Replacement Within Four-Dimensionalism lunch break Thorben Petersen (Bremen) - Were the whole Realm of Nature mine, that were a Present far too small Daniel Saudek (Brixen) - Deriving Change and Time From an Ontology of Substances and Dispositions Luca Banfi (Dublin) - Presentism and the Passage of Time Barbara Vetter (FU Berlin) - Potentiality Through Time |
Workshop description
The main topic of this satellite workshop will be persistence. Usually, the problem of persistence is motivated via Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Prima facie, there is a logical problem in reconciling trans-temporal identity with the exchange of properties. If, now, change is conceptualised as the exchange of properties (difference) of the same entity (identity) at different times, the problem of persistence displays itself as the philosophical question how difference and identity can be conceived together.
Different strategies to avoid the problem have been proposed. Simply put there are, on the one hand, approaches that formulate existence as a tenseless concept and conceive of the world as a four- dimensional spacetime continuum. Those include Willard Van Orman Quine’s spacetime worms, David Lewis’s perdurantism, Ted Sider’s stage theory and Yuri Balashov’s version of exdurantism. On the other hand, there are approaches which view the world and the material objects in it as three-dimensional entities.
Four-dimensional approaches have the great advantage that they can ground persistence in the persisting entity. However, they can only offer surrogates for persistence. As David Oderberg has pointed out, there can be no real change in a four-dimensionalistic ontology because four-dimensionalism presupposes that there is only the replacement of different – in part very similar – spatio-temporal objects. As of yet, an actually plausible explanation for persistence — especially for difference and change — is also missing from the endurantistic counterproposals.
The main topic of this satellite workshop will be persistence. Usually, the problem of persistence is motivated via Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Prima facie, there is a logical problem in reconciling trans-temporal identity with the exchange of properties. If, now, change is conceptualised as the exchange of properties (difference) of the same entity (identity) at different times, the problem of persistence displays itself as the philosophical question how difference and identity can be conceived together.
Different strategies to avoid the problem have been proposed. Simply put there are, on the one hand, approaches that formulate existence as a tenseless concept and conceive of the world as a four- dimensional spacetime continuum. Those include Willard Van Orman Quine’s spacetime worms, David Lewis’s perdurantism, Ted Sider’s stage theory and Yuri Balashov’s version of exdurantism. On the other hand, there are approaches which view the world and the material objects in it as three-dimensional entities.
Four-dimensional approaches have the great advantage that they can ground persistence in the persisting entity. However, they can only offer surrogates for persistence. As David Oderberg has pointed out, there can be no real change in a four-dimensionalistic ontology because four-dimensionalism presupposes that there is only the replacement of different – in part very similar – spatio-temporal objects. As of yet, an actually plausible explanation for persistence — especially for difference and change — is also missing from the endurantistic counterproposals.
Registration
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to florian.fischer@uni-siegen.de to let us know you are coming.
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to florian.fischer@uni-siegen.de to let us know you are coming.
Organisation
Florian Fischer and Ludwig Jaskolla
Florian Fischer and Ludwig Jaskolla
Abstracts
Presentism and the Passage of Time
Luca Banfi (Dublin)
ThThis paper aims to defend presentism, according to which only present things exist, from three arguments that deny its consistency with the passage of time. It has been recently, and surprisingly, argued that presentism lacks the resources to account for the passage of time. Fine (2005), Leininger (2015) and Price (2011) have developed arguments against presentism for this conclusion. The three arguments share another assumption: they all agree that presentists acknowledge the existence of an absolute present moment of time – i.e. A-theory of time. To be more precise, Fine’s target consists just in the A-theory; in the paper I argue that if presentism implies the A-theory, then Fine’s argument against the A-theory counts as an argument against presentism.
However, to say that presentism is a version of the A-theory is a controversial assumption: some presentists (see Sanson & Caplan, 2010; Tallant & Ingram, 2015) believe that there are no such things as times and tenses are primitive, from which it follows that there is not even a time that is privileged; conversely, others (see Bourne, 2006; Crisp, 2007; and Markosian, 2004) are realists about times, conceived as maximal, consistent and temporary propositions. Only this latter version of presentism, by acknowledging the existence of times, implies that only one of them, the present, exists objectively. For this reason, I regard the three arguments as against this version of presentism and it is this version of presentism that I aim to defend.
Luca Banfi (Dublin)
ThThis paper aims to defend presentism, according to which only present things exist, from three arguments that deny its consistency with the passage of time. It has been recently, and surprisingly, argued that presentism lacks the resources to account for the passage of time. Fine (2005), Leininger (2015) and Price (2011) have developed arguments against presentism for this conclusion. The three arguments share another assumption: they all agree that presentists acknowledge the existence of an absolute present moment of time – i.e. A-theory of time. To be more precise, Fine’s target consists just in the A-theory; in the paper I argue that if presentism implies the A-theory, then Fine’s argument against the A-theory counts as an argument against presentism.
However, to say that presentism is a version of the A-theory is a controversial assumption: some presentists (see Sanson & Caplan, 2010; Tallant & Ingram, 2015) believe that there are no such things as times and tenses are primitive, from which it follows that there is not even a time that is privileged; conversely, others (see Bourne, 2006; Crisp, 2007; and Markosian, 2004) are realists about times, conceived as maximal, consistent and temporary propositions. Only this latter version of presentism, by acknowledging the existence of times, implies that only one of them, the present, exists objectively. For this reason, I regard the three arguments as against this version of presentism and it is this version of presentism that I aim to defend.
Existential Fragility and Stage Replacement Within Four-Dimensionalism
Matteo Benocci (Reading)
The ongoing debate about persistence has taken the form of a dispute between two theories: Endurance Theory and Four-Dimensionalism. Endurance Theory and Four-Dimensionalism are committed to different views of the existential stability of objects. Endurance theorists endorse the view that ordinary objects tend to remain in existence unless some perturbation makes them pass away. By contrast, four-dimensionalists maintain that the world is made up of momentary objects, which pass away instantaneously and are eventually replaced by later objects having some appropriate continuity with the earlier ones. In this paper, I argue that this basic difference, though overlooked in the literature on the topic, is relevant to the adjudication of the debate about persistence. First, I show that endurance theorists have only to maintain that objects are disposed to remain in existence in certain conditions and to pass away in other conditions, and that this view can be worked out just by appealing to the causal structure of the world as it is studied by natural science. At the end of the day, endurance theorists do not need to posit any special metaphysical principle or to impose any constraint on the space of metaphysical possibilities. By contrast, the continuous replacement theorized by four-dimensionalists can only be accommodated either by invoking special dispositions or by imposing certain constraints on the modal space. I conclude that this asymmetry counts in favour of Endurance Theory over Four-Dimensionalism.
Matteo Benocci (Reading)
The ongoing debate about persistence has taken the form of a dispute between two theories: Endurance Theory and Four-Dimensionalism. Endurance Theory and Four-Dimensionalism are committed to different views of the existential stability of objects. Endurance theorists endorse the view that ordinary objects tend to remain in existence unless some perturbation makes them pass away. By contrast, four-dimensionalists maintain that the world is made up of momentary objects, which pass away instantaneously and are eventually replaced by later objects having some appropriate continuity with the earlier ones. In this paper, I argue that this basic difference, though overlooked in the literature on the topic, is relevant to the adjudication of the debate about persistence. First, I show that endurance theorists have only to maintain that objects are disposed to remain in existence in certain conditions and to pass away in other conditions, and that this view can be worked out just by appealing to the causal structure of the world as it is studied by natural science. At the end of the day, endurance theorists do not need to posit any special metaphysical principle or to impose any constraint on the space of metaphysical possibilities. By contrast, the continuous replacement theorized by four-dimensionalists can only be accommodated either by invoking special dispositions or by imposing certain constraints on the modal space. I conclude that this asymmetry counts in favour of Endurance Theory over Four-Dimensionalism.
What are Change-Makers and Why Do We Need Them
Florian Fischer (Siegen)
The philosophical debate about persistence revolves around examples of changes. A change in color is a typical example employed in the publications on persistence; say a ball changing its color from red to green. Following David Lewis, this change of color is problematic for persistence since it is in tension with a plausible principle, sometimes called Leibniz Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. This principle states that if A and B are identical then they share all their properties. Now, the ball which is red is identical to the green ball, but being green is incompatible with being red. The debate about persistence focuses on conceptualizing changes, like this change in color of said ball, in a way that removes the tension with Leibniz Law. The question of how the change in color happens is generally not covered. Contrary, I argue that we need to give an account of how changes are brought about if we want to understand persistence. Personally, I believe that dispositions are the entities which bring changes about, the change-makers, so to say. I will present a theory of dispositions — the triadic process account of dispositions TPD — and show how it avoids the looming incompatibility in the context of Leibniz Law.
Florian Fischer (Siegen)
The philosophical debate about persistence revolves around examples of changes. A change in color is a typical example employed in the publications on persistence; say a ball changing its color from red to green. Following David Lewis, this change of color is problematic for persistence since it is in tension with a plausible principle, sometimes called Leibniz Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. This principle states that if A and B are identical then they share all their properties. Now, the ball which is red is identical to the green ball, but being green is incompatible with being red. The debate about persistence focuses on conceptualizing changes, like this change in color of said ball, in a way that removes the tension with Leibniz Law. The question of how the change in color happens is generally not covered. Contrary, I argue that we need to give an account of how changes are brought about if we want to understand persistence. Personally, I believe that dispositions are the entities which bring changes about, the change-makers, so to say. I will present a theory of dispositions — the triadic process account of dispositions TPD — and show how it avoids the looming incompatibility in the context of Leibniz Law.
A Powerful Particulars View of Causation, Constitution, and Persistence
Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (Lund)
Causation, constitution, and persistence are traditionally characterized in incompatible ways. Causation as a diachronic relation between distinct entities, persistence as a diachronic relation an object has to itself, and constitution as a synchronous relation between parts and whole. I argue that the neo-Aristotelian view of causation I presented in ‘Causal Production as Interaction’ (2002) offers a plausible causal account of the constitution and persistence of compound entities. Like other powers-based accounts, I characterise effects as the mutual manifestation of reciprocal interactions between powerful particulars. However, they describe the mutuality involved as one of equal importance of so-called disposition partners, but depict the interaction as unidirectional; one object acts while the other receives the influence. However, modern science does not recognise any form of unidirectional action and insists that all interactions are perfectly reciprocal, i.e. that whenever one object exerts an influence the other simultaneously exerts a proportional influence of the same kind on the first, but in the opposite direction. To accept the reciprocity of interactions opens up the possibility of a causal account of constitution and persistence, because the relationship between the constituents of compound objects is reciprocal in exactly the same way as the relationship between two distinct objects; its just that the interaction between component parts of a unity do not only produce a change, but also preserves the structure of the unity. On this view, change, constitution, and persistence are merely different sides of the same coin: causation.
Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (Lund)
Causation, constitution, and persistence are traditionally characterized in incompatible ways. Causation as a diachronic relation between distinct entities, persistence as a diachronic relation an object has to itself, and constitution as a synchronous relation between parts and whole. I argue that the neo-Aristotelian view of causation I presented in ‘Causal Production as Interaction’ (2002) offers a plausible causal account of the constitution and persistence of compound entities. Like other powers-based accounts, I characterise effects as the mutual manifestation of reciprocal interactions between powerful particulars. However, they describe the mutuality involved as one of equal importance of so-called disposition partners, but depict the interaction as unidirectional; one object acts while the other receives the influence. However, modern science does not recognise any form of unidirectional action and insists that all interactions are perfectly reciprocal, i.e. that whenever one object exerts an influence the other simultaneously exerts a proportional influence of the same kind on the first, but in the opposite direction. To accept the reciprocity of interactions opens up the possibility of a causal account of constitution and persistence, because the relationship between the constituents of compound objects is reciprocal in exactly the same way as the relationship between two distinct objects; its just that the interaction between component parts of a unity do not only produce a change, but also preserves the structure of the unity. On this view, change, constitution, and persistence are merely different sides of the same coin: causation.
Substrates of Change
Ludger Jansen (Bochum)
The times they are a-changing, Bob Dylan sings. But are they? Metaphysical orthodoxy does not agree: Time are not substrates of change, but the medium of change. But why? And what, then, is changing? In order to discuss this question, I will proceed as follows: First, I will distinguish various possible conceptions of change: change of truth values (Cambridge change), change by replacement, and real change (Aristotelian change). Second, I will discuss various candidates for the substrates of change: Dylan’s times, the world, Aristotelian substances, and properties like qualities and dispositions. In doing so, I will rehearse several arguments for and against assigning the honorific of being a substrate of change to these candidates. Unsurprisingly I will argue that the soundness of these arguments depends on the conception of change one embraces.
Ludger Jansen (Bochum)
The times they are a-changing, Bob Dylan sings. But are they? Metaphysical orthodoxy does not agree: Time are not substrates of change, but the medium of change. But why? And what, then, is changing? In order to discuss this question, I will proceed as follows: First, I will distinguish various possible conceptions of change: change of truth values (Cambridge change), change by replacement, and real change (Aristotelian change). Second, I will discuss various candidates for the substrates of change: Dylan’s times, the world, Aristotelian substances, and properties like qualities and dispositions. In doing so, I will rehearse several arguments for and against assigning the honorific of being a substrate of change to these candidates. Unsurprisingly I will argue that the soundness of these arguments depends on the conception of change one embraces.
Process-Ontology and the Puzzle of Persistence
Ludwig Jaskolla (Munich)
The Problem of Persistence is notorious for being adamant in its insolubility. In addition to the “classical” solutions in analytic metaphysics – i.e. threedimensional endruantism and fourdimensional perdurantism – there have been relatively new approaches to modeling persistence – e.g. Sider’s stage-perdurantism (where some, like Balashov, have even contested that stage-theory is a form of perdurantism). In addition, there has been a relatively recent renaissance of deflationism about persistence in analytic meta-metaphysics. The situation seems to be, to say the least, dodgy.
Nevertheless, others, like Fischer or Seibt, have proposed that we might make progress concerning questions about persistence, if we adapt our ontological framework. In this paper, I want to explore the explanatory power of process-ontology for advancing a more viable solution to the problem of persistence.
I proceed in four steps: (1) I start by briefly introducing the problem of persistence as an everyday phenomenon, which I call the “fact of persistence.” (2) Then I will develop the “puzzle of persistence” as a genuine philosophical problem, which arises from the “fact of persistence”. I will argue that the puzzle of persistence is basically a problem about diachronic identity and change – and that endurantism and perdurantism are equally ill suited for solving this puzzle. Then (3) I sketch a process-ontology and (4) show how this ontology solves the problem of persistence.
Ludwig Jaskolla (Munich)
The Problem of Persistence is notorious for being adamant in its insolubility. In addition to the “classical” solutions in analytic metaphysics – i.e. threedimensional endruantism and fourdimensional perdurantism – there have been relatively new approaches to modeling persistence – e.g. Sider’s stage-perdurantism (where some, like Balashov, have even contested that stage-theory is a form of perdurantism). In addition, there has been a relatively recent renaissance of deflationism about persistence in analytic meta-metaphysics. The situation seems to be, to say the least, dodgy.
Nevertheless, others, like Fischer or Seibt, have proposed that we might make progress concerning questions about persistence, if we adapt our ontological framework. In this paper, I want to explore the explanatory power of process-ontology for advancing a more viable solution to the problem of persistence.
I proceed in four steps: (1) I start by briefly introducing the problem of persistence as an everyday phenomenon, which I call the “fact of persistence.” (2) Then I will develop the “puzzle of persistence” as a genuine philosophical problem, which arises from the “fact of persistence”. I will argue that the puzzle of persistence is basically a problem about diachronic identity and change – and that endurantism and perdurantism are equally ill suited for solving this puzzle. Then (3) I sketch a process-ontology and (4) show how this ontology solves the problem of persistence.
Time after Change
Anna Marmodoro (Oxford/Durham) and Andrea Roselli (Durham)
How primitive is time in relation to change? How do we go about to investigate this metaphysical problem? I propose to start with Plato's and Aristotle's views on change, time and number; and then propose a novel solution about how order enters the universe.
Anna Marmodoro (Oxford/Durham) and Andrea Roselli (Durham)
How primitive is time in relation to change? How do we go about to investigate this metaphysical problem? I propose to start with Plato's and Aristotle's views on change, time and number; and then propose a novel solution about how order enters the universe.
Changing
John Pemberton (LSE)
As Johanna Seibt notes, philosophers have long found changing (or ‘dynamicity’) an elusive concept.
The ontological basis for such consideration of changing is often along the lines of Russell: the obtaining of similar properties (events) at a densely infinite series of ‘neighbouring’ places. Sometimes a relation of causality, rather than similarity, is posited between such component states. In any case, the states come first and some story is told about how to connect them. Within such ontologies, change consists of the obtaining of one little thing and then another related different little thing shortly after. A change from P to ¬P is surely a step change rather than changing. But even where properties are continuous values of a determinable each component state seems unchanging.
Entities which act through time in the manner of Aristotelian agents/ patients offer an alternative ontology. In order to act through time, such entities must obtain through time (not just a single point in time). Importantly, the particles associated with the basic forces of physics may be understood as acting through time, e.g. a mass attracting another mass. I shall show how this fits with Esfeld and Deckert’s view that contemporary physics characterises elementary particles according to their patterns of change of distance relations – so that matter points must be understood as permanent, i.e. existing through time.
Entities which exist through time in this way do license a notion of changing, e.g. changing in respect of relative positions and velocities of a spatial arrangement of entities.
John Pemberton (LSE)
As Johanna Seibt notes, philosophers have long found changing (or ‘dynamicity’) an elusive concept.
The ontological basis for such consideration of changing is often along the lines of Russell: the obtaining of similar properties (events) at a densely infinite series of ‘neighbouring’ places. Sometimes a relation of causality, rather than similarity, is posited between such component states. In any case, the states come first and some story is told about how to connect them. Within such ontologies, change consists of the obtaining of one little thing and then another related different little thing shortly after. A change from P to ¬P is surely a step change rather than changing. But even where properties are continuous values of a determinable each component state seems unchanging.
Entities which act through time in the manner of Aristotelian agents/ patients offer an alternative ontology. In order to act through time, such entities must obtain through time (not just a single point in time). Importantly, the particles associated with the basic forces of physics may be understood as acting through time, e.g. a mass attracting another mass. I shall show how this fits with Esfeld and Deckert’s view that contemporary physics characterises elementary particles according to their patterns of change of distance relations – so that matter points must be understood as permanent, i.e. existing through time.
Entities which exist through time in this way do license a notion of changing, e.g. changing in respect of relative positions and velocities of a spatial arrangement of entities.
Were the whole Realm of Nature mine, that were a Present far too small
Thorben Petersen (Bremen)
A theory of time is not the same as a theory about presentness. Still, any valuable theory of time will have to say something informative about this phenomenon. The principal aim of my talk is to point out that different theories of time conceive differently about it.
According to presentism, for instance, we are talking about a dynamical entity. Indeed, most presentists take it that THE PRESENT is an entity that changes. Moving spotlight theorists, similarly, claim that THE SPOTLIGHT is moving. Reductionists of time, by contrast, typically conceive of presentness in relative terms. Thus most reductionists conceive of presentness in psychological terms and claim that things are ever only psychologically present to different cognitive subjects.
An interesting question turning up in this connection is whether presentists, moving spotlighters and reductionists are actually talking about different phenomena and whether, at least in principle, both parties could be right. To answer this question, I give a detailed analysis of how different theories conceive of presentness and disentangle the various senses associated with the English form [present].
Thorben Petersen (Bremen)
A theory of time is not the same as a theory about presentness. Still, any valuable theory of time will have to say something informative about this phenomenon. The principal aim of my talk is to point out that different theories of time conceive differently about it.
According to presentism, for instance, we are talking about a dynamical entity. Indeed, most presentists take it that THE PRESENT is an entity that changes. Moving spotlight theorists, similarly, claim that THE SPOTLIGHT is moving. Reductionists of time, by contrast, typically conceive of presentness in relative terms. Thus most reductionists conceive of presentness in psychological terms and claim that things are ever only psychologically present to different cognitive subjects.
An interesting question turning up in this connection is whether presentists, moving spotlighters and reductionists are actually talking about different phenomena and whether, at least in principle, both parties could be right. To answer this question, I give a detailed analysis of how different theories conceive of presentness and disentangle the various senses associated with the English form [present].
Form, Stability-Makers, and Homeostasis
Petter Sandstad (Rostock)
There are some changes which a substance cannot undergo while still persisting. In many cases, one or more homeostatic mechanisms are in place to ensure that the substance does not undergo a change which hinders the substance from persisting. A simple example is the vital homeostatic mechanism controlling a human’s core temperature.
Strictly speaking, stability-makers are change-makers. They do make a difference, and they do have causal efficacy. Stability-makers will bring about some change in order to avoid some other change.
Stability-makers can be understood to be, or consist of, dispositions that are finks or masks/antidotes. Or shorter, one can follow Aristotle and understand stability-makers as dispositions to resist change. The typical cases of finks and masks/antidotes are external to the substance. For instance, an antidote to a poison is external to Robert who has swallowed poison. In contrast, homeostatic mechanisms are internal to an organism/artefact/system.
Here enters form, as the internal principle of a substance. First, form gives a substance’s identity- and persistence-criteria. It is then trivial that a substance’s form settles which changes a substance cannot undergo while persisting, as this is what persistence-criteria are. Second, form is also the internal principle of a substance’s homeostatic mechanisms. Humans, in common with all mammals, are warm-blooded or more precisely homeothermic. And it is because we are mammals that we have this homeostatic mechanism. More generally, I conclude that form is what makes substances have stability-makers.
Petter Sandstad (Rostock)
There are some changes which a substance cannot undergo while still persisting. In many cases, one or more homeostatic mechanisms are in place to ensure that the substance does not undergo a change which hinders the substance from persisting. A simple example is the vital homeostatic mechanism controlling a human’s core temperature.
Strictly speaking, stability-makers are change-makers. They do make a difference, and they do have causal efficacy. Stability-makers will bring about some change in order to avoid some other change.
Stability-makers can be understood to be, or consist of, dispositions that are finks or masks/antidotes. Or shorter, one can follow Aristotle and understand stability-makers as dispositions to resist change. The typical cases of finks and masks/antidotes are external to the substance. For instance, an antidote to a poison is external to Robert who has swallowed poison. In contrast, homeostatic mechanisms are internal to an organism/artefact/system.
Here enters form, as the internal principle of a substance. First, form gives a substance’s identity- and persistence-criteria. It is then trivial that a substance’s form settles which changes a substance cannot undergo while persisting, as this is what persistence-criteria are. Second, form is also the internal principle of a substance’s homeostatic mechanisms. Humans, in common with all mammals, are warm-blooded or more precisely homeothermic. And it is because we are mammals that we have this homeostatic mechanism. More generally, I conclude that form is what makes substances have stability-makers.
Deriving Change and Time From an Ontology of Substances and Dispositions
Daniel Saudek (Innsbruck)
I will argue that the notions of change and of time can be derived non-circularly given simple assumptions about substances and their dispositions. In this way, the Newtonian assumption whereby everything is “in” a time existing indepedently of other entities is turned on its head. In detail, I will propose a derivation of three properties of time: 1. its ordering properties, in particular the relation “before” between events; 2. its metric properties, i.e. the length of time intervals and their comparison; 3. time’s “arrow” or one-way street character, whereby time only moves “forward”, leaving behind a fixed and unchangeable past and heading into an open future which can be influenced. The overall picture is that time indeed “flows” in a robust sense, unlike in the classical block universe, but such time is a local phenomenon “attached to” a substance, not an absolute passage as envisaged by classical A-theory. Such a model of time’s arrow requires no ontologically privileged relation of simultaneity between spacelike-separated events and no “global now”, in consonance with what relativity theory teaches us about time.
Daniel Saudek (Innsbruck)
I will argue that the notions of change and of time can be derived non-circularly given simple assumptions about substances and their dispositions. In this way, the Newtonian assumption whereby everything is “in” a time existing indepedently of other entities is turned on its head. In detail, I will propose a derivation of three properties of time: 1. its ordering properties, in particular the relation “before” between events; 2. its metric properties, i.e. the length of time intervals and their comparison; 3. time’s “arrow” or one-way street character, whereby time only moves “forward”, leaving behind a fixed and unchangeable past and heading into an open future which can be influenced. The overall picture is that time indeed “flows” in a robust sense, unlike in the classical block universe, but such time is a local phenomenon “attached to” a substance, not an absolute passage as envisaged by classical A-theory. Such a model of time’s arrow requires no ontologically privileged relation of simultaneity between spacelike-separated events and no “global now”, in consonance with what relativity theory teaches us about time.
Potentiality Through Time
Barbara Vetter (FU Berlin)
Dispositionalism about modality holds that all modal truths are ultimately grounded in the dispositions – or, more generally, the potentialities – of individual objects. I have developed and defended such a view (Vetter 2015). In this paper, I turn to a major unresolved issue for dispositionalism: the relation between metaphysical modality and time. Potentiality differs from metaphysical modality as we usually conceive it in two ways. First, potentiality is dated: like other properties, potentialities are possessed by objects at a given time, and are subject to change. Metaphysical modality, on the other hand, is timeless and unchanging. Second, potentiality is directed: their manifestation concerns the future or the present, but not the past (relative to the time of their possession). Metaphysical modality, it seems, does not have such a direction in time. I argue that the dispositionalist can deal with both these apparent disanalogies, but only at the cost of accepting certain claims about the metaphysics of time.
Barbara Vetter (FU Berlin)
Dispositionalism about modality holds that all modal truths are ultimately grounded in the dispositions – or, more generally, the potentialities – of individual objects. I have developed and defended such a view (Vetter 2015). In this paper, I turn to a major unresolved issue for dispositionalism: the relation between metaphysical modality and time. Potentiality differs from metaphysical modality as we usually conceive it in two ways. First, potentiality is dated: like other properties, potentialities are possessed by objects at a given time, and are subject to change. Metaphysical modality, on the other hand, is timeless and unchanging. Second, potentiality is directed: their manifestation concerns the future or the present, but not the past (relative to the time of their possession). Metaphysical modality, it seems, does not have such a direction in time. I argue that the dispositionalist can deal with both these apparent disanalogies, but only at the cost of accepting certain claims about the metaphysics of time.
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