International Workshop
Time and Modality
Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives
20 - 22 July 2017
University of Bonn
Library of the Chair of Medieval Philosophy (Prof. Dr. Wouter Goris)
Time and Modality
Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives
20 - 22 July 2017
University of Bonn
Library of the Chair of Medieval Philosophy (Prof. Dr. Wouter Goris)
Talks
Medieval
Richard Cross (Notre Dame) - Two kinds of passive potency in Duns Scotus
Simo Knuutila (Helsinki) - Defense and Criticism of Temporal Frequency Accounts of Modality in Medieval and Early Modern Thought
Calvin Normore (UCLA) - Present Possibilities
JT Paasch (Georgetown) - The Semantics of Priority and Posteriority
Ernesto Perini-Santos (UFMG) - Time, Tense and Modality in William of Ockham
Christian Rode (Bonn) - Time, Modality and Anselm's Argument
Magali Roques (Hamburg) - Ockham on Essential Dependence and Causation
Sara Uckelman (Durham) - Medieval and Modern Approaches to the Semantics of 'While' Propositions
Contemporary
Jiri Benovsky (Fribourg) - Alethic Modalities and Temporal Modalities
Kit Fine (NYU) - Truthmaking and the Is-Ought Gap
Florian Fischer (Bonn) - Diachronic Natural Necessity
Uwe Meixner (Augsburg) - Being Metaphysically Serious about the Now and Actuality
Thomas Sattig (Tübingen) - Dynamic Temporal Experience in a Static Universe
Niko Strobach (Münster) - Tensed Mereology - How it Works and Why We Need it
Tuomas Tahko (Helsinki) - Bridge Principles Between Physical and Metaphysical Modality
Timothy Williamson (Oxford) - Time and Modality in Phase Space
Richard Cross (Notre Dame) - Two kinds of passive potency in Duns Scotus
Simo Knuutila (Helsinki) - Defense and Criticism of Temporal Frequency Accounts of Modality in Medieval and Early Modern Thought
Calvin Normore (UCLA) - Present Possibilities
JT Paasch (Georgetown) - The Semantics of Priority and Posteriority
Ernesto Perini-Santos (UFMG) - Time, Tense and Modality in William of Ockham
Christian Rode (Bonn) - Time, Modality and Anselm's Argument
Magali Roques (Hamburg) - Ockham on Essential Dependence and Causation
Sara Uckelman (Durham) - Medieval and Modern Approaches to the Semantics of 'While' Propositions
Contemporary
Jiri Benovsky (Fribourg) - Alethic Modalities and Temporal Modalities
Kit Fine (NYU) - Truthmaking and the Is-Ought Gap
Florian Fischer (Bonn) - Diachronic Natural Necessity
Uwe Meixner (Augsburg) - Being Metaphysically Serious about the Now and Actuality
Thomas Sattig (Tübingen) - Dynamic Temporal Experience in a Static Universe
Niko Strobach (Münster) - Tensed Mereology - How it Works and Why We Need it
Tuomas Tahko (Helsinki) - Bridge Principles Between Physical and Metaphysical Modality
Timothy Williamson (Oxford) - Time and Modality in Phase Space
Program
Thursday, 20. July 2017
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14:00 - 15:00
15:15 - 16:15 16:45 - 17:45 18:00 - 19:00 |
Richard Cross (Notre Dame) - Two kinds of passive potency in Duns Scotus
Magali Roques (Hamburg) - Ockham on Essential Dependence and Causation Florian Fischer (Bonn) - Diachronic Natural Necessity Timothy Williamson (Oxford) - Time and Modality in Phase Space |
Friday, 21. July 2017
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10:15 - 11:15
11:30 - 12:30 14:00 - 15:00 15:15 - 16:15 16:45 - 17:45 18:00 - 19:00 |
Jiri Benovsky (Fribourg) - Alethic Modalities and Temporal Modalities
Thomas Sattig (Tübingen) - Dynamic Temporal Experience in a Static Universe Lunch break JT Paasch (Georgetown) - The Semantics of Priority and Posteriority Calvin Normore (UCLA) - Present Possibilities Christian Rode (Bonn) - Time, Modality and Anselm's Argument Simo Knuuttila (Helsinki) - Defense and Criticism of Temporal Frequency Accounts of Modality in Medieval and Early Modern Thought Conference Dinner |
Saturday, 22. Juli 2017
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10:15 - 11:15
11:30 - 12:30 14:00 - 15:00 15:15 - 16:15 16:45 - 17:45 18:00 - 19:00 |
Ernesto Perini-Santos (UFMG) - Time, Tense and Modality in William of Ockham
Sara Uckelman (Durham) - Medieval and Modern Approaches to the Semantics of 'While' Propositions Lunch break Tuomas Tahko (Helsinki) - Bridge Principles Between Physical and Metaphysical Modality Niko Strobach (Münster) - Tensed Mereology - How it Works and Why We Need it Uwe Meixner (Augsburg) - Being Metaphysically Serious about the Now and Actuality Kit Fine (NYU) - Truthmaking and the Is-Ought Gap |
Abstracts
Alethic Modalities and Temporal Modalities
Jiri Benovsky
I am interested here in four versions of what is often referred to as "the Humphrey objection". This objection was initially raised by Kripke against Lewis's modal counterpart theory, so this is where I will start the discussion. As we will see, there is a perfectly good answer to the objection. I will then examine other places where a similar objection can be raised: it can arise in the case of temporal counterpart theory (in fact, it can arise in the case of all kinds of counterpart theories, independently on modal realism), and a very similar worry can also arise against modal realism itself or against an ersatzist theory of possible worlds itself. For similar reasons, in similar situations, a similar objection will arise. What is interesting is that it is not the case that a similar response can be given in all of these similar cases. So, in the end, we will see what dissimilarities there are and how and why they are relevant. In particular, we will see the differences there are between alethic modalities and temporal modalities. In the case of alethic modalities (metaphysical necessity and possibility), the objection can be answered by appealing to the notion of representation, while this does not work very well in the case of temporal modalities.
Jiri Benovsky
I am interested here in four versions of what is often referred to as "the Humphrey objection". This objection was initially raised by Kripke against Lewis's modal counterpart theory, so this is where I will start the discussion. As we will see, there is a perfectly good answer to the objection. I will then examine other places where a similar objection can be raised: it can arise in the case of temporal counterpart theory (in fact, it can arise in the case of all kinds of counterpart theories, independently on modal realism), and a very similar worry can also arise against modal realism itself or against an ersatzist theory of possible worlds itself. For similar reasons, in similar situations, a similar objection will arise. What is interesting is that it is not the case that a similar response can be given in all of these similar cases. So, in the end, we will see what dissimilarities there are and how and why they are relevant. In particular, we will see the differences there are between alethic modalities and temporal modalities. In the case of alethic modalities (metaphysical necessity and possibility), the objection can be answered by appealing to the notion of representation, while this does not work very well in the case of temporal modalities.
Diachronic Natural Necessity
Florian Fischer
In my talk I will sketch a dispositional theory of modality. Dispositions are often associated with necessity, i.e. metaphysical necessity is supposed to be the binding force between the stimulus and the manifestation of a dispositions, whereby the stimulus and the manifestation are understood as events. Contrary to this, I will argue that the manifestation of a disposition is a process and that natural necessity it the necessity involved. I will first present a synchronic picture dispositional modality and then consider how to extend this to an diachronic picture.
Florian Fischer
In my talk I will sketch a dispositional theory of modality. Dispositions are often associated with necessity, i.e. metaphysical necessity is supposed to be the binding force between the stimulus and the manifestation of a dispositions, whereby the stimulus and the manifestation are understood as events. Contrary to this, I will argue that the manifestation of a disposition is a process and that natural necessity it the necessity involved. I will first present a synchronic picture dispositional modality and then consider how to extend this to an diachronic picture.
Defense and Criticism of Temporal Frequency Accounts of Modality in Medieval and Early Modern Thought
Simo Knuutila
Early medieval treatises on logic included a temporal frequency interpretation of modal notions, equating necessity, contingency, or impossibility to always true, sometimes true, and never true. While this was not regarded as a general theory of modality by Aristotelians and others, they considered its elements as compatible with more elaborate philosophical theories of generic modalities. In late medieval times, the frequency model and its background assumptions were increasingly criticized in the new interpretation of the intended domain in the Aristotelian definition of possibility as that which if assumed to be realized results into anything impossible. My aim is to shed light on these arguments and discuss some late medieval and early modern examples of not accepting the new ideas and sticking to the temporal frequency model.
Simo Knuutila
Early medieval treatises on logic included a temporal frequency interpretation of modal notions, equating necessity, contingency, or impossibility to always true, sometimes true, and never true. While this was not regarded as a general theory of modality by Aristotelians and others, they considered its elements as compatible with more elaborate philosophical theories of generic modalities. In late medieval times, the frequency model and its background assumptions were increasingly criticized in the new interpretation of the intended domain in the Aristotelian definition of possibility as that which if assumed to be realized results into anything impossible. My aim is to shed light on these arguments and discuss some late medieval and early modern examples of not accepting the new ideas and sticking to the temporal frequency model.
Being Metaphysically Serious about the Now and Actuality
Uwe Meixner
The talk expounds a fundamental conflict of philosophical opinion: the conflict between those who believe that temporal and modal indexicality is a metaphysically deep linguistic phenomenon, and those who don’t believe this. It turns out that the conflict is at bottom a conflict in metaphysics. What is ultimately at issue is whether temporal and modal indexicality points – or does not point – to a larger realm of being than can be captured by the totality of possible worlds. It is proposed that the conflict is rationally undecidable.
Uwe Meixner
The talk expounds a fundamental conflict of philosophical opinion: the conflict between those who believe that temporal and modal indexicality is a metaphysically deep linguistic phenomenon, and those who don’t believe this. It turns out that the conflict is at bottom a conflict in metaphysics. What is ultimately at issue is whether temporal and modal indexicality points – or does not point – to a larger realm of being than can be captured by the totality of possible worlds. It is proposed that the conflict is rationally undecidable.
Time, Tense and Modality in William of Ockham
Ernesto Perini-Santos
William of Ockham has a very peculiar definition of modality: every term that is predicable of a whole sentence is a modal term. His definition reaches well beyond the Aristotelian modalities: ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, ‘contingent’ and ‘impossible’ can be predicated of a whole sentence, but so can be ‘known’, ‘believed’, ‘written’, ‘spoken’ etc. A modal sentence is a sentence that states that a modal term is predicated of a sentence for which its subject, a dictum propositionis, supposits. According to his definition, there is no modal copula. There is, of course, a de possibili copula, ‘potest esse’. This syncategormatic device is not part of Ockham’s theory of modality, but belongs to his theory concerning past tense and future tense verbs. While there are certain similarities concerning the Ockhamian semantics of modalities and of non present tense copulae, they are distinct conceptual frameworks that converge at the treatment of alethic modalities. There is a good motivation to keep these theories apart, or so I will argue, and, in so doing, I will also try to sketch some features of Ockham’s metaphysics of time.
Ernesto Perini-Santos
William of Ockham has a very peculiar definition of modality: every term that is predicable of a whole sentence is a modal term. His definition reaches well beyond the Aristotelian modalities: ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, ‘contingent’ and ‘impossible’ can be predicated of a whole sentence, but so can be ‘known’, ‘believed’, ‘written’, ‘spoken’ etc. A modal sentence is a sentence that states that a modal term is predicated of a sentence for which its subject, a dictum propositionis, supposits. According to his definition, there is no modal copula. There is, of course, a de possibili copula, ‘potest esse’. This syncategormatic device is not part of Ockham’s theory of modality, but belongs to his theory concerning past tense and future tense verbs. While there are certain similarities concerning the Ockhamian semantics of modalities and of non present tense copulae, they are distinct conceptual frameworks that converge at the treatment of alethic modalities. There is a good motivation to keep these theories apart, or so I will argue, and, in so doing, I will also try to sketch some features of Ockham’s metaphysics of time.
Time, Modality and Anselm’s Argument
Christian Rode
In his Proslogion, Anselm of Canterbury wants to bring forward one single argument in order to prove God’s existence. This argument consists, as Holopainen has shown, in the formulation „that than which nothing greater can be thought“. Now in his discussion with Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, Anselm employs a temporal and mereological conception of contingency and necessity. My paper aims at answering the question whether this temporal conception of modality supports the one argument or is even included in it, or whether it is an addition to the argument that weakens its argumentative strength.
Christian Rode
In his Proslogion, Anselm of Canterbury wants to bring forward one single argument in order to prove God’s existence. This argument consists, as Holopainen has shown, in the formulation „that than which nothing greater can be thought“. Now in his discussion with Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, Anselm employs a temporal and mereological conception of contingency and necessity. My paper aims at answering the question whether this temporal conception of modality supports the one argument or is even included in it, or whether it is an addition to the argument that weakens its argumentative strength.
Ockham on the Essentiality of Origin
Magali Roques
In my book on Ockham’s essentialism, I suggested that Ockham puts forwards a proof for the claim that identity is necessary. This proof states that if a is identical to b, then a is necessary identical to b. Such a proof is strikingly similar to the one developed by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity. In the present paper, I intend to investigate whether Ockham defends even stronger essentialist assumptions than the necessity of identity. In particular, does Ockham accept Kripke’s famous thesis on the essentiality of origin? I showed in my book that Ockham endorses such a claim concerning material objects such as natural substances. Now I intend to investigate whether this claim extends to persons. As we will see, Ockham gives a positive answer to this question.
Magali Roques
In my book on Ockham’s essentialism, I suggested that Ockham puts forwards a proof for the claim that identity is necessary. This proof states that if a is identical to b, then a is necessary identical to b. Such a proof is strikingly similar to the one developed by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity. In the present paper, I intend to investigate whether Ockham defends even stronger essentialist assumptions than the necessity of identity. In particular, does Ockham accept Kripke’s famous thesis on the essentiality of origin? I showed in my book that Ockham endorses such a claim concerning material objects such as natural substances. Now I intend to investigate whether this claim extends to persons. As we will see, Ockham gives a positive answer to this question.
Dynamic Temporal Experience in a Static Universe
Thomas Sattig
We seem to experience time as flowing. Yet according to the leading metaphysical picture of time, the block-universe theory, time in fact does not flow. Block-lovers typically react to this apparent tension by unhitching the sense of flow in our temporal experience from temporal reality, holding that temporal experience is systematically illusory. I shall develop a new block-friendly account of the sense of flow, which preserves a match of temporal experience and temporal reality. According to this account, the sense of flow arises from higher-order temporal experience.
Thomas Sattig
We seem to experience time as flowing. Yet according to the leading metaphysical picture of time, the block-universe theory, time in fact does not flow. Block-lovers typically react to this apparent tension by unhitching the sense of flow in our temporal experience from temporal reality, holding that temporal experience is systematically illusory. I shall develop a new block-friendly account of the sense of flow, which preserves a match of temporal experience and temporal reality. According to this account, the sense of flow arises from higher-order temporal experience.
Tensed Merelogy - how it works and why we need it
Niko Strobach
At least mereologists should feel the need for an elaborate temporal merelogy, and those who appreciate the importance of the A-series should like it tensed. Maybe, once such a theory is better known, it will persuade other metaphysians, in particular metaphysicians of time (and modality), that mereology is worthwhile. It has been surprisingly little noticed that an elaborate tensed mereology is now available due to the groundbreaking research of Paul Hovda. A part of the talk has the simple aim to provide some acquaintance with the outlines of Hovda's results, which are not exactly easy reading. Another part of the talk will link tensed mereology with use cases like Inwagen's argument against mereological universalism and his important more recent thesis that merelogical sums can change their parts.
Niko Strobach
At least mereologists should feel the need for an elaborate temporal merelogy, and those who appreciate the importance of the A-series should like it tensed. Maybe, once such a theory is better known, it will persuade other metaphysians, in particular metaphysicians of time (and modality), that mereology is worthwhile. It has been surprisingly little noticed that an elaborate tensed mereology is now available due to the groundbreaking research of Paul Hovda. A part of the talk has the simple aim to provide some acquaintance with the outlines of Hovda's results, which are not exactly easy reading. Another part of the talk will link tensed mereology with use cases like Inwagen's argument against mereological universalism and his important more recent thesis that merelogical sums can change their parts.
Bridge Principles Between Physical and Metaphysical Modality
Tuomas E. Tahko
Some recent work in the epistemology of modality has navigated towards ‘modal empiricism’, which suggests that empirical considerations are an important if not the only source of modal knowledge. Those attracted to modal empiricism will likely agree with Peter van Inwagen’s sceptical remarks regarding our ability to settle the modal status of propositions concerning things like the possibility of transparent iron or naturally occurring purple cows. Van Inwagen argued that if we do not know the underlying mechanisms that would enable such phenomena, then we cannot assess whether they are metaphysically possible. Importantly, van Inwagen thought that conceivability is not going to take us any further here. Does this mean that we can only acquire modal knowledge of scenarios constrained by the actual laws of physics, i.e., nomological or physical modality? This would be one possible conclusion. However, I will suggest that if we adopt a hybrid theory of the epistemology of modality, there may be some hope to bridge the gap between physical and metaphysical modality. Van Inwagen’s scepticism is to be taken seriously and we must indeed be able to identify the underlying mechanisms that could act as the truthmakers of modal claims such the ones that van Inwagen mentions. But we must be allowed to vary some aspects of the modal scenarios that we entertain if we hope to assess physically impossible but metaphysically possible scenarios. In this paper, I will make a start in outlining the bridge principles that could enable us to do so.
Tuomas E. Tahko
Some recent work in the epistemology of modality has navigated towards ‘modal empiricism’, which suggests that empirical considerations are an important if not the only source of modal knowledge. Those attracted to modal empiricism will likely agree with Peter van Inwagen’s sceptical remarks regarding our ability to settle the modal status of propositions concerning things like the possibility of transparent iron or naturally occurring purple cows. Van Inwagen argued that if we do not know the underlying mechanisms that would enable such phenomena, then we cannot assess whether they are metaphysically possible. Importantly, van Inwagen thought that conceivability is not going to take us any further here. Does this mean that we can only acquire modal knowledge of scenarios constrained by the actual laws of physics, i.e., nomological or physical modality? This would be one possible conclusion. However, I will suggest that if we adopt a hybrid theory of the epistemology of modality, there may be some hope to bridge the gap between physical and metaphysical modality. Van Inwagen’s scepticism is to be taken seriously and we must indeed be able to identify the underlying mechanisms that could act as the truthmakers of modal claims such the ones that van Inwagen mentions. But we must be allowed to vary some aspects of the modal scenarios that we entertain if we hope to assess physically impossible but metaphysically possible scenarios. In this paper, I will make a start in outlining the bridge principles that could enable us to do so.
Medieval and Modern Approaches to the Semantics of 'While' Propositions
Sara Uckelman
Medieval analyses of molecular propositions include many non-truthfunctional connectives in addition to the standard modern binary connectives (conjunction, disjunction, and conditional). Two types of non-truthfunctional molecular propositions considered by a number of 13th- and 14th-century authors are temporal and local propositions, which combine atomic propositions with `while' and `where'. Despite modern interest in the historical roots of temporal and tense logic, medieval analyses of `while' propositions are rarely discussed in modern literature, and analyses of `where' propositions are almost completely overlooked. In this paper we introduce 13th- and 14th-century views on temporal and local propositions, and connect the medieval theories with modern temporal and spatial counterparts.
Sara Uckelman
Medieval analyses of molecular propositions include many non-truthfunctional connectives in addition to the standard modern binary connectives (conjunction, disjunction, and conditional). Two types of non-truthfunctional molecular propositions considered by a number of 13th- and 14th-century authors are temporal and local propositions, which combine atomic propositions with `while' and `where'. Despite modern interest in the historical roots of temporal and tense logic, medieval analyses of `while' propositions are rarely discussed in modern literature, and analyses of `where' propositions are almost completely overlooked. In this paper we introduce 13th- and 14th-century views on temporal and local propositions, and connect the medieval theories with modern temporal and spatial counterparts.
Time and Modality in Phase Space
Timothy Williamson
The use of abstract phase spaces to model the diachronic behaviour of physical systems is ubiquitous in contemporary science. Although the models themselves are characterized in standard mathematical terms, which are non-modal and non-temporal, their intended interpretations are modal and temporal: the elements of the space are understood as possible states of a physical system at a time. A semantics for a formal language with modal and temporal operators and propositional quantifiers can be defined over such models in a natural way, thereby making explicit the modal dimension of the science. This will be illustrated in detail with reference to dynamical systems theory. Similarities and differences will be discussed between the points in these models and those in more familiar models of modal-temporal logic will be discussed. Extensions of the language with individual quantifiers will also be sketched.
Timothy Williamson
The use of abstract phase spaces to model the diachronic behaviour of physical systems is ubiquitous in contemporary science. Although the models themselves are characterized in standard mathematical terms, which are non-modal and non-temporal, their intended interpretations are modal and temporal: the elements of the space are understood as possible states of a physical system at a time. A semantics for a formal language with modal and temporal operators and propositional quantifiers can be defined over such models in a natural way, thereby making explicit the modal dimension of the science. This will be illustrated in detail with reference to dynamical systems theory. Similarities and differences will be discussed between the points in these models and those in more familiar models of modal-temporal logic will be discussed. Extensions of the language with individual quantifiers will also be sketched.
Venue
Library of the Chair for Medieval Philosophy (Prof. Dr. Wouter Goris)
University of Bonn
Main Building
1. Floor
Am Hof 1
53113 Bonn
Library of the Chair for Medieval Philosophy (Prof. Dr. Wouter Goris)
University of Bonn
Main Building
1. Floor
Am Hof 1
53113 Bonn
Registration
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to fischerf@uni-bonn.de to let us know you are coming.
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to fischerf@uni-bonn.de to let us know you are coming.
Organisation
Elke Brendel, Florian Fischer and Magali Roques
Elke Brendel, Florian Fischer and Magali Roques
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The SPoT is very thankful to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for the generous funding of this event! |
