International Workshop
Powers and Change
24 March 2017
Ryle Room / Faculty of Philosophy / University of Oxford
Powers and Change
24 March 2017
Ryle Room / Faculty of Philosophy / University of Oxford
Alexander Bird (Bristol)
Nancy Cartwright (Durham)
Damiano Costa (Fribourg / Lugano)
Dan Deasy (Dublin)
Barbara Vetter (Erlangen-Nürnberg)
Alastair Wilson (Birmingham)
Nancy Cartwright (Durham)
Damiano Costa (Fribourg / Lugano)
Dan Deasy (Dublin)
Barbara Vetter (Erlangen-Nürnberg)
Alastair Wilson (Birmingham)
Program
|
10:00–10:30
10.30–11:30 13:30–14:30 14:45–15:45 16:15–17:15 17:30–18:30 |
Florian Fischer (Bonn) - Introduction
Damiano Costa (Fribourg / Lugano) - Six Ways of Being in Time Dan Deasy (Dublin) - Change on the B-Theory Alastair Wilson (Oxford) - Skow on Change Nancy Cartwright (Durham) – Powers, Contributions and What Really Happens Alexander Bird (Bristol) - Dispositional Essentialism and Diachronic Metaphysical Necessity |
Registration
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to [email protected] to let us know you are coming.
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to [email protected] to let us know you are coming.
Organisation
Florian Fischer and Martin Pickup
Florian Fischer and Martin Pickup
|
The SPoT is very thankful to Eugene Ludwig and the Ludwig Fund for the generous funding of this event! |
Abstracts
Damiano Costa - Six Ways of Being in Time
According to a standard definition of persistence, something persists iff it exists at various times. And according to a standard definition of temporality/concreteness, something is temporal/concrete iff it exists at least at a time. Both definitions make use of a seemingly relational predicate – existence at a time. But what is existence at a time, and what is it for an object to exist at a time? This question, which is central to address some of the most fundamental topics in contemporary metaphysics – such as the topics of time and persistence – has received only scattered and indirect attention in contemporary metaphysics (van Fraassen 1970, Sider 2001, Simons 2000, 2014, Fine 2006, Gilmore, 2006, Sattig 2006, Parsons 2007, McDaniel 2007, Costa forthcoming). In this talk I will present the first systematic treatment of this question by putting forward six theories about existence at a time and by engaging critically with them I will conclude that one of them – according to which for an object to exist at a time is for it to be the subject of events that occur at that time – is preferable to all other theories that have been discussed.
According to a standard definition of persistence, something persists iff it exists at various times. And according to a standard definition of temporality/concreteness, something is temporal/concrete iff it exists at least at a time. Both definitions make use of a seemingly relational predicate – existence at a time. But what is existence at a time, and what is it for an object to exist at a time? This question, which is central to address some of the most fundamental topics in contemporary metaphysics – such as the topics of time and persistence – has received only scattered and indirect attention in contemporary metaphysics (van Fraassen 1970, Sider 2001, Simons 2000, 2014, Fine 2006, Gilmore, 2006, Sattig 2006, Parsons 2007, McDaniel 2007, Costa forthcoming). In this talk I will present the first systematic treatment of this question by putting forward six theories about existence at a time and by engaging critically with them I will conclude that one of them – according to which for an object to exist at a time is for it to be the subject of events that occur at that time – is preferable to all other theories that have been discussed.
Dan Deasy - Change on the B-Theory
There is a widespread assumption in the metaphysics of time that B-theorists (according to whom there is nothing metaphysically special about the present moment in virtue of which it is present) must treat the standard tense operators (‘it was the case that’, ‘it will be the case that’ and so on) as implicit quantifier-restrictors, so that, for example, an utterance at instant t of the sentence ‘There used to be dinosaurs’ is true just in case there is an instant t* earlier than t such that there are dinosaurs located at t*. However, there are very good reasons for rejecting this assumption. First, I provide some evidence from the recent literature for the assumption. Next, I show – using a kind of argument familiar from the literature on Lewis's Modal Realism – that the assumption leads to contradiction when combined with other core B-theoretic theses. Next, I consider and reject some attempts to avoid the conclusion of the argument without rejecting the assumption, and also respond to an objection to rejecting the assumption. Finally, I show that rejecting the assumption has some interesting consequences for our understanding of change on the B-theory.
There is a widespread assumption in the metaphysics of time that B-theorists (according to whom there is nothing metaphysically special about the present moment in virtue of which it is present) must treat the standard tense operators (‘it was the case that’, ‘it will be the case that’ and so on) as implicit quantifier-restrictors, so that, for example, an utterance at instant t of the sentence ‘There used to be dinosaurs’ is true just in case there is an instant t* earlier than t such that there are dinosaurs located at t*. However, there are very good reasons for rejecting this assumption. First, I provide some evidence from the recent literature for the assumption. Next, I show – using a kind of argument familiar from the literature on Lewis's Modal Realism – that the assumption leads to contradiction when combined with other core B-theoretic theses. Next, I consider and reject some attempts to avoid the conclusion of the argument without rejecting the assumption, and also respond to an objection to rejecting the assumption. Finally, I show that rejecting the assumption has some interesting consequences for our understanding of change on the B-theory.
Alastair Wilson - Skow on Change
Bradford Skow, in his recent book Objective Becoming, has offered a version of the moving spotlight theory of time which he claims gives us 'objective becoming' without 'robust change'. I'll offer some reasons for doubting this claim of Skow's, and in the process I'll hopefully cast some light on what can and cannot be explained by a B-theory of time.
Bradford Skow, in his recent book Objective Becoming, has offered a version of the moving spotlight theory of time which he claims gives us 'objective becoming' without 'robust change'. I'll offer some reasons for doubting this claim of Skow's, and in the process I'll hopefully cast some light on what can and cannot be explained by a B-theory of time.
Barbara Vetter - Potentiality Through Time
Dispositionalism about modality holds that all modal truths are ultimately grounded in the dispositions – or, more generally, the potentialities – of individual objects. I have developed and defended such a view (Vetter 2015). In this paper, I turn to a major unresolved issue for dispositionalism: the relation between metaphysical modality and time. Potentiality differs from metaphysical modality as we usually conceive it in two ways. First, potentiality is dated: like other properties, potentialities are possessed by objects at a given time, and are subject to change. Metaphysical modality, on the other hand, is timeless and unchanging. Second, potentiality is directed: their manifestation concerns the future or the present, but not the past (relative to the time of their possession). Metaphysical modality, it seems, does not have such a direction in time. I argue that the dispositionalist can deal with both these apparent disanalogies, but only at the cost of accepting certain claims about the metaphysics of time.
Dispositionalism about modality holds that all modal truths are ultimately grounded in the dispositions – or, more generally, the potentialities – of individual objects. I have developed and defended such a view (Vetter 2015). In this paper, I turn to a major unresolved issue for dispositionalism: the relation between metaphysical modality and time. Potentiality differs from metaphysical modality as we usually conceive it in two ways. First, potentiality is dated: like other properties, potentialities are possessed by objects at a given time, and are subject to change. Metaphysical modality, on the other hand, is timeless and unchanging. Second, potentiality is directed: their manifestation concerns the future or the present, but not the past (relative to the time of their possession). Metaphysical modality, it seems, does not have such a direction in time. I argue that the dispositionalist can deal with both these apparent disanalogies, but only at the cost of accepting certain claims about the metaphysics of time.
Alexander Bird - Dispositional Essentialism and Diachronic Metaphysical Necessity
Can there be metaphysically necessary relations between events or states of affairs that are separated in space and time? Does dispositional essentialism assume or require that there can? In particularm does it entail the causation is an example of diachronic necessity? And if so, is that a problem for dispositional essentialism? Markus Schrenk (‘The Powerlessness of Necessity’, Noûs 2010) argues that dispositional essentialists do hold that there can be such diachronic necessities. However, that cannot be correct because of the possibility of interference. So dispositional essentialists are mistaken in their use of metaphysical necessity. I argue, on the other hand, that dispositional essentialism is not committed to causal necessitation being metaphysical necessitation. On the other hand there can be some diachronic necessities that are not subject to interference.
Can there be metaphysically necessary relations between events or states of affairs that are separated in space and time? Does dispositional essentialism assume or require that there can? In particularm does it entail the causation is an example of diachronic necessity? And if so, is that a problem for dispositional essentialism? Markus Schrenk (‘The Powerlessness of Necessity’, Noûs 2010) argues that dispositional essentialists do hold that there can be such diachronic necessities. However, that cannot be correct because of the possibility of interference. So dispositional essentialists are mistaken in their use of metaphysical necessity. I argue, on the other hand, that dispositional essentialism is not committed to causal necessitation being metaphysical necessitation. On the other hand there can be some diachronic necessities that are not subject to interference.
Nancy Cartwright – Powers, Contributions and What Really Happens
