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- What better time than then
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- Der Gegenwartige Augenblick
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- Time, What is Time
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- Time after Time
- It's About Time
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International Workshop
What Better Time Than Then?
18 - 19 October 2019
University of Siegen
What Better Time Than Then?
18 - 19 October 2019
University of Siegen
Talks
John Barnden (Birmingham) - Implications concerning Time Metaphysics of a Meta-Causative Approach to Consciousness
Philipp Bohlen (Bonn) - Inner Time and the Heterogeneity of the Tenses
Florian Fischer (Siegen) - Becoming
Dirk Franken (Mainz) - From Orgin Essentialism to Essence Originalism
Marcello Garibbo (Siegen) - Kant on the Intuition of Time
Thorben Petersen (Bremen) - Time, Reduction & Emergence
Daniel Saudek (Frankfurt) - Asymmetries: exploring the connections between causal, logical and temporal
Thomas Sukopp (Siegen) - "Du siehst, mein Sohn, zum Raum wird hier die Zeit" - Zeitkonzepte in den Werken von Richard Wagner
Larissa Wallner (LMU Munich) - Similarities between Kantian and Husserlian Philosophy of Time
John Barnden (Birmingham) - Implications concerning Time Metaphysics of a Meta-Causative Approach to Consciousness
Philipp Bohlen (Bonn) - Inner Time and the Heterogeneity of the Tenses
Florian Fischer (Siegen) - Becoming
Dirk Franken (Mainz) - From Orgin Essentialism to Essence Originalism
Marcello Garibbo (Siegen) - Kant on the Intuition of Time
Thorben Petersen (Bremen) - Time, Reduction & Emergence
Daniel Saudek (Frankfurt) - Asymmetries: exploring the connections between causal, logical and temporal
Thomas Sukopp (Siegen) - "Du siehst, mein Sohn, zum Raum wird hier die Zeit" - Zeitkonzepte in den Werken von Richard Wagner
Larissa Wallner (LMU Munich) - Similarities between Kantian and Husserlian Philosophy of Time
Program
Friday, 18th October 2019
10:30 - 11:30
Thomas Sukopp (Siegen) - "Du siehst, mein Sohn, zum Raum wird hier die Zeit" - Zeitkonzepte in den Werken von Richard Wagner
11:45 - 12:45
Dirk Franken (Mainz) - From Orgin Essentialism to Essence Originalism
lunch break
14:15 - 15:15
Philipp Bohlen (Bonn) - Inner Time and the Heterogeneity of the Tenses
15:30 - 16:30
Marcello Garibbo (Siegen) - Kant on the Intuition of Time
17:00 - 18:00
Larissa Wallner (LMU Munich) - Similarities between Kantian and Husserlian Philosophy of Time
dinner
10:30 - 11:30
Thomas Sukopp (Siegen) - "Du siehst, mein Sohn, zum Raum wird hier die Zeit" - Zeitkonzepte in den Werken von Richard Wagner
11:45 - 12:45
Dirk Franken (Mainz) - From Orgin Essentialism to Essence Originalism
lunch break
14:15 - 15:15
Philipp Bohlen (Bonn) - Inner Time and the Heterogeneity of the Tenses
15:30 - 16:30
Marcello Garibbo (Siegen) - Kant on the Intuition of Time
17:00 - 18:00
Larissa Wallner (LMU Munich) - Similarities between Kantian and Husserlian Philosophy of Time
dinner
Saturday, 19th October 2019
10:30 - 11:30
Daniel Saudek (Frankfurt) - Asymmetries: exploring the connections between causal, logical and temporal
11:45 - 12:45
John Barnden (Birmingham) - Implications concerning Time Metaphysics of a Meta-Causative Approach to Consciousness
lunch break
14:15 - 15:15
Thorben Petersen (Bremen) - Time, Reduction & Emergence
15:30 - 16:30
Florian Fischer (Siegen) - Becoming
10:30 - 11:30
Daniel Saudek (Frankfurt) - Asymmetries: exploring the connections between causal, logical and temporal
11:45 - 12:45
John Barnden (Birmingham) - Implications concerning Time Metaphysics of a Meta-Causative Approach to Consciousness
lunch break
14:15 - 15:15
Thorben Petersen (Bremen) - Time, Reduction & Emergence
15:30 - 16:30
Florian Fischer (Siegen) - Becoming
Venue
University of Siegen
Neuer Senatssaal (Room: AR-NA 016)
Campus Adolf-Reichwein-Straße
Adolf-Reichwein-Straße 2
57076 Siegen
University of Siegen
Neuer Senatssaal (Room: AR-NA 016)
Campus Adolf-Reichwein-Straße
Adolf-Reichwein-Straße 2
57076 Siegen
Registration
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to [email protected] to let us know you are coming.
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to [email protected] to let us know you are coming.
Abstracts
Time, memory and mental time travel
Nathália de Ávila
This communication has the aim of presenting the beginning of my doctoral thesis, whose topic is the structure of time one can find in the cognitive ability named mental time travel. Discussing this topic relates certain issues in philosophy of time to some others discussed in philosophy of memory.
Mental time travel is the terminology that designates the phenomenon of projecting ourselves back in our past experiences in order to pre-live our future ones, in a sort of anticipatory behavior and pre-constructions of future scenarios of our lives (Cf. Sundeddorf and Corballis, 2007). It is a discussion that gained attention after several studies in cognitive sciences that discovered that the brain areas that are activated when we think about our personal past are actually very similar to those activated when we make a future projection (Cf. Spreng and Levine, 2006). This may cause a tendency to interpret past and future in a more intimate way than we are used to, through the commonsensical idea that the future is unknown or non-existent. Those interesting discoveries also changed the idea that memory is about the past to open the possibility of it being also about the future.
Mental time travel, however, has a disquieting aspect for someone who is interested in philosophy of time: if in the domain of our psychewe are dealing with time understood as a subjective comprehensive experience, is it really the case that the commonsensical properties of time that gained popularity through physics (linear, progressive and non-reoccurring) should be applied once we discuss time in memory? For me, personally, if this debate is to be established at all it has to cross at least two issues in philosophy of time, namely the discussion on temporal topologies and secondly, the question if time in memory is unified or not.
Nathália de Ávila
This communication has the aim of presenting the beginning of my doctoral thesis, whose topic is the structure of time one can find in the cognitive ability named mental time travel. Discussing this topic relates certain issues in philosophy of time to some others discussed in philosophy of memory.
Mental time travel is the terminology that designates the phenomenon of projecting ourselves back in our past experiences in order to pre-live our future ones, in a sort of anticipatory behavior and pre-constructions of future scenarios of our lives (Cf. Sundeddorf and Corballis, 2007). It is a discussion that gained attention after several studies in cognitive sciences that discovered that the brain areas that are activated when we think about our personal past are actually very similar to those activated when we make a future projection (Cf. Spreng and Levine, 2006). This may cause a tendency to interpret past and future in a more intimate way than we are used to, through the commonsensical idea that the future is unknown or non-existent. Those interesting discoveries also changed the idea that memory is about the past to open the possibility of it being also about the future.
Mental time travel, however, has a disquieting aspect for someone who is interested in philosophy of time: if in the domain of our psychewe are dealing with time understood as a subjective comprehensive experience, is it really the case that the commonsensical properties of time that gained popularity through physics (linear, progressive and non-reoccurring) should be applied once we discuss time in memory? For me, personally, if this debate is to be established at all it has to cross at least two issues in philosophy of time, namely the discussion on temporal topologies and secondly, the question if time in memory is unified or not.
Consciousness, Meta-Causation and Temporal Passage (Real or Imagined)
John Barnden
In a highly exploratory spirit I present ramifications, concerning the philosophy of time, of a theory I am developing about [phenomenal] consciousness. This theory starts, in part, with an assumption that consciousness involves pre-reflective auto-sensitivity (related to a widely-proposed though contentious assumption of pre-reflective self-consciousness). From this assumption I argue that a conscious physical process must be able continuously to identify which particular process it itself is; and from there I argue that the process must involve meta-causation in being directly causally sensitive to its own inner causation as such. Notably, it’s not enough for each state in the process to be causally sensitive to the process’s prior physical-state trajectory (as ordinarily understood). Consequently the proposal requires, in a radically anti-Humean vein, that causation, suitably defined, be an objective physical quality irreducible to ordinary state trajectories. Accordingly, I use the term “causation” to mean the universe’s fundamental physical dynamism, i.e., its physical-law governed (or power governed) unfolding, and assume this to be irreducible to sheer regular spatiotemporal patterning of familiar physical quantities. Indeed, I strongly reify dynamism, taking spatio-temporally specific instances of it as a “new” realm of physical quantities, themselves physically interacting with other quantities (familiar or new). That interaction is a new level of dynamism, namely meta-dynamism (= meta-causation given the adopted meaning of “causation”). I claim that consciousness is at least partly constituted ofsomespecialtypeorarrangement of meta-dynamism. (Because of this specialness, other forms of meta-dynamismmayin principle beimportantin ways totally unrelated to consciousness.) The theory is congenial to A-theory views about time, and was initially developed in that spirit. However, the talk countenances also a non-dynamic, more B-theory-like, though still anti-Humean, alternative. Here, causation is the mutual constraining of different pieces of the overall space-time “block,” where this constraining is irreducible to the sheer patterning of ordinary physical quantities. Meta-causation is now meta-constraint: the constraining of constraints themselves. Both theory versions generate novel suggestions. For instance, the non-dynamic version suggests a new way for consciousness, including experience of temporal passage, to inhabit the“block”; while the dynamic version suggests that real passage, as well as being an aspect of dynamism, might meta-dynamically interact with other aspects of the world, or even with itself.
John Barnden
In a highly exploratory spirit I present ramifications, concerning the philosophy of time, of a theory I am developing about [phenomenal] consciousness. This theory starts, in part, with an assumption that consciousness involves pre-reflective auto-sensitivity (related to a widely-proposed though contentious assumption of pre-reflective self-consciousness). From this assumption I argue that a conscious physical process must be able continuously to identify which particular process it itself is; and from there I argue that the process must involve meta-causation in being directly causally sensitive to its own inner causation as such. Notably, it’s not enough for each state in the process to be causally sensitive to the process’s prior physical-state trajectory (as ordinarily understood). Consequently the proposal requires, in a radically anti-Humean vein, that causation, suitably defined, be an objective physical quality irreducible to ordinary state trajectories. Accordingly, I use the term “causation” to mean the universe’s fundamental physical dynamism, i.e., its physical-law governed (or power governed) unfolding, and assume this to be irreducible to sheer regular spatiotemporal patterning of familiar physical quantities. Indeed, I strongly reify dynamism, taking spatio-temporally specific instances of it as a “new” realm of physical quantities, themselves physically interacting with other quantities (familiar or new). That interaction is a new level of dynamism, namely meta-dynamism (= meta-causation given the adopted meaning of “causation”). I claim that consciousness is at least partly constituted ofsomespecialtypeorarrangement of meta-dynamism. (Because of this specialness, other forms of meta-dynamismmayin principle beimportantin ways totally unrelated to consciousness.) The theory is congenial to A-theory views about time, and was initially developed in that spirit. However, the talk countenances also a non-dynamic, more B-theory-like, though still anti-Humean, alternative. Here, causation is the mutual constraining of different pieces of the overall space-time “block,” where this constraining is irreducible to the sheer patterning of ordinary physical quantities. Meta-causation is now meta-constraint: the constraining of constraints themselves. Both theory versions generate novel suggestions. For instance, the non-dynamic version suggests a new way for consciousness, including experience of temporal passage, to inhabit the“block”; while the dynamic version suggests that real passage, as well as being an aspect of dynamism, might meta-dynamically interact with other aspects of the world, or even with itself.
Freedom as the temporal unfolding of being; Schelling’s temporal ontology in the freedom essay
Philipp Bohlen
One of the most philosophically neglected accounts inphilosophy of time is the one of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, one of the central figures of postkantian German Idealism.
In my talk, I want to reconstruct Schelling's concept of inner time [Eigenzeit] as it is first presented in the Stuttgart Lecturesand worked out in the Ages of the World. For middle to late Schelling, time is the basic form of individuation. Everything derives its meaning and actuality by temporally unfolding a specific combination of the principles of being. These principles, or potencies, are instantiated in every actual thing, but in a way that is intrinsically conflictual. To overcome this internal deficiency built into actual being, there needs to be progression and evolution. This progression, i.e. time, thus, is nothing abstract or external, but rather innate to every being, determining its actuality. I will try to lay out the basic structures of Schelling’s concept of inner time, as it is instantiated by every being as a whole. It will become apparent that every object, insofar it is determined in any way, is nothing but a nexus of its own inner past and future. Therefore, Schelling claims a heterogeneity-thesis: the three tenses have to be all at the same time [zumal] and to make this possible, they are conceived as strictly heterogenous.
To flesh this out, I will illustrate some of the motivations that lead to Schelling’s unique temporal ontology as well as some of the various arguments Schelling offers in support for it.
Philipp Bohlen
One of the most philosophically neglected accounts inphilosophy of time is the one of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, one of the central figures of postkantian German Idealism.
In my talk, I want to reconstruct Schelling's concept of inner time [Eigenzeit] as it is first presented in the Stuttgart Lecturesand worked out in the Ages of the World. For middle to late Schelling, time is the basic form of individuation. Everything derives its meaning and actuality by temporally unfolding a specific combination of the principles of being. These principles, or potencies, are instantiated in every actual thing, but in a way that is intrinsically conflictual. To overcome this internal deficiency built into actual being, there needs to be progression and evolution. This progression, i.e. time, thus, is nothing abstract or external, but rather innate to every being, determining its actuality. I will try to lay out the basic structures of Schelling’s concept of inner time, as it is instantiated by every being as a whole. It will become apparent that every object, insofar it is determined in any way, is nothing but a nexus of its own inner past and future. Therefore, Schelling claims a heterogeneity-thesis: the three tenses have to be all at the same time [zumal] and to make this possible, they are conceived as strictly heterogenous.
To flesh this out, I will illustrate some of the motivations that lead to Schelling’s unique temporal ontology as well as some of the various arguments Schelling offers in support for it.
From Orgin Essentialism to Essence Originalism
Dirk Franken
The claim that at least some objects have their origins essentially (origin essentialism) is widespread. But it will be argued that the standard arguments for this claim fail to reveal its true significance. This significance lies in the fact that origin essentialism is a corollary of a fundamental principle about objects as such. Alluding to this connection, this principle shall be called essence originalism. To a first approximation, it says that, part of what makes an object O an object – in contrast to an event, say – is that, which object O is, is determined at or up to the moment of O’s origin. Essence originalism will be motivated and set into relation to both the endurance/perdurance-distinction and the distinction between objects, events and processes.
Dirk Franken
The claim that at least some objects have their origins essentially (origin essentialism) is widespread. But it will be argued that the standard arguments for this claim fail to reveal its true significance. This significance lies in the fact that origin essentialism is a corollary of a fundamental principle about objects as such. Alluding to this connection, this principle shall be called essence originalism. To a first approximation, it says that, part of what makes an object O an object – in contrast to an event, say – is that, which object O is, is determined at or up to the moment of O’s origin. Essence originalism will be motivated and set into relation to both the endurance/perdurance-distinction and the distinction between objects, events and processes.
"Du siehst, mein Sohn, zum Raum wird hier die Zeit" - Zeitkonzepte in den Werken von Richard Wagner
Thomas Sukopp
Dass sich Richard Wagner mit philosophischen Theorien, die u.a. auch Probleme von Raum und Zeit berühren, beschäftigt hat, ist relativ unumstritten. Im Vortrag wird es zunächst darum gehen, überblicksartig ein Grundverständnis für Wagners musikalisches Schaffen zu erlangen (1. Abschnitt). Anschließend sollen schlaglichtartig einige der Auffassungen von Richard Wagner dargestellt werden, die für eine Philosophie der Zeit von Belang seien könnten (2. Abschnitt). Schließlich geht es um eine Interpretation der Aussage Gurnemanz‘ im Parsifal (3. Abschnitt). Die Hauptthese, die ich erläutern und begründen werde, ist, dass erstens Wagners Konzept des Gesamtkunstwerks, genauer sein Verständnis davon, was ein Drama ausmacht, zentral von Raum-Zeit-Verhältnissen abhängt, zweitens, dass Wagners christlich-buddhistische Metaphysik hilft zu verstehen, was Wagner das „Raum-Zeit-Problem“ nannte und dass drittens Wagners Auffassungen hinsichtlich der Transformationen von Raum und Zeit sich parallelisieren lassen mit modernen physikalischen Sichtweisen, etwa der Untrennbarkeit von Raum und Zeit im Sinne Einsteins. Dass Wagner freilich Konzepte der modernen Physik vorweggenommen hat, ist zwar eine steile These, die meines Erachtens aber nicht haltbar ist.
“You see, my son, here time becomes space”—concept of time in the works of Richard Wagner
Thomas Sukopp
It is quite indisputable that Richard Wagner has more or less competently dealt with philosophical questions, especially with problems of space and time, amongst others. My talk aims first at giving brief survey-like basic information to understand the composer Wagner (ch. 1). Subsequently, we will sketch some of Wagner’s views that could be relevant in the context of philosophy of time (ch. 2). Finally, I will interpret Gurnemanz’ statement in Act 1 of Parsifal, referring to the title of my talk (ch. 3). My main thesis is that, firstly, Wagner’s concept of “Gesamtkunstwerk” (engl. “total work of art”), especially the notion of “drama” depends on time-pace-relations. Secondly, Wagner’s Christian-Buddhist metaphysics helps to understand what he means by the “time-space-problem”. Thirdly, it is instructive to parallelize transformations of time and space with modern physical views, e.g. the inseparableness of time and space (Einstein). Nevertheless, to argue that Wagner is a kind of precursor of modern physics would be preposterous.
Thomas Sukopp
Dass sich Richard Wagner mit philosophischen Theorien, die u.a. auch Probleme von Raum und Zeit berühren, beschäftigt hat, ist relativ unumstritten. Im Vortrag wird es zunächst darum gehen, überblicksartig ein Grundverständnis für Wagners musikalisches Schaffen zu erlangen (1. Abschnitt). Anschließend sollen schlaglichtartig einige der Auffassungen von Richard Wagner dargestellt werden, die für eine Philosophie der Zeit von Belang seien könnten (2. Abschnitt). Schließlich geht es um eine Interpretation der Aussage Gurnemanz‘ im Parsifal (3. Abschnitt). Die Hauptthese, die ich erläutern und begründen werde, ist, dass erstens Wagners Konzept des Gesamtkunstwerks, genauer sein Verständnis davon, was ein Drama ausmacht, zentral von Raum-Zeit-Verhältnissen abhängt, zweitens, dass Wagners christlich-buddhistische Metaphysik hilft zu verstehen, was Wagner das „Raum-Zeit-Problem“ nannte und dass drittens Wagners Auffassungen hinsichtlich der Transformationen von Raum und Zeit sich parallelisieren lassen mit modernen physikalischen Sichtweisen, etwa der Untrennbarkeit von Raum und Zeit im Sinne Einsteins. Dass Wagner freilich Konzepte der modernen Physik vorweggenommen hat, ist zwar eine steile These, die meines Erachtens aber nicht haltbar ist.
“You see, my son, here time becomes space”—concept of time in the works of Richard Wagner
Thomas Sukopp
It is quite indisputable that Richard Wagner has more or less competently dealt with philosophical questions, especially with problems of space and time, amongst others. My talk aims first at giving brief survey-like basic information to understand the composer Wagner (ch. 1). Subsequently, we will sketch some of Wagner’s views that could be relevant in the context of philosophy of time (ch. 2). Finally, I will interpret Gurnemanz’ statement in Act 1 of Parsifal, referring to the title of my talk (ch. 3). My main thesis is that, firstly, Wagner’s concept of “Gesamtkunstwerk” (engl. “total work of art”), especially the notion of “drama” depends on time-pace-relations. Secondly, Wagner’s Christian-Buddhist metaphysics helps to understand what he means by the “time-space-problem”. Thirdly, it is instructive to parallelize transformations of time and space with modern physical views, e.g. the inseparableness of time and space (Einstein). Nevertheless, to argue that Wagner is a kind of precursor of modern physics would be preposterous.
Similarities between Kantian and Husserlian Philosophy of Time
Larissa Wallner
Kant and Husserl are often and rightfully regarded as representatives of opposing philosophical traditions and schools. While Kant intended to build a system with his three critiques, to give final answers to the famous questions in the field of epistemology, metaphysics of morals and nature/arts, Husserl is one of the founders of Phenomenology, a philosophical approach, which developed in opposition to scientific naturalism and had in mind to find a way to reach our reality as human beings located in a world, in a body. Even though Husserl’s thinking was evoked by and directed also against Neo-Kantianism, Kant and Husserl share a lot, when it comes to the identification of theoretical philosophy with transcendental philosophy which aim is to outline the conditions of experience at all („überhaupt“). This is exemplarily and distinctly presented by the shared results concerning the role time plays grounding and determining experience and the characteristics they ascribe to time.
In my talk I will start with this general feature of time being an a priori condition of the possibility of experience, emphasizing the great gap between Kant and Husserl. In a next step I will investigate the shared distinction (in different terminology) of Kant's “Anschauungsvollzug” and the object on the one hand and Husserl's “Auffassungsakt” and “Auffassungsinhalt” on the other hand. Not only are there similarities between the Kantian synthesis of reproduction and the Husserlian retention, but there are similar notions of the possibility of experiencing duration, succession and simultaneity – with one major difference in the description of non-causal succession. Finally there is a strong equivalence on the level of time as the form of the inner sense in Kant and time as form of consciousness in Husserl’s analysis of Phenomenology of inner time-consciousness.
Lastly, I would suggest that one can read Kant in some aspects as a phenomenologist avant la lettre and in some aspects Husserl as a Postkantian. Certainly, there remain fundamental differences concerning method and axioms of their philosophy, but their philosophy of time brings them together more closely and sheds an inspiring light on both of their approaches.
Larissa Wallner
Kant and Husserl are often and rightfully regarded as representatives of opposing philosophical traditions and schools. While Kant intended to build a system with his three critiques, to give final answers to the famous questions in the field of epistemology, metaphysics of morals and nature/arts, Husserl is one of the founders of Phenomenology, a philosophical approach, which developed in opposition to scientific naturalism and had in mind to find a way to reach our reality as human beings located in a world, in a body. Even though Husserl’s thinking was evoked by and directed also against Neo-Kantianism, Kant and Husserl share a lot, when it comes to the identification of theoretical philosophy with transcendental philosophy which aim is to outline the conditions of experience at all („überhaupt“). This is exemplarily and distinctly presented by the shared results concerning the role time plays grounding and determining experience and the characteristics they ascribe to time.
In my talk I will start with this general feature of time being an a priori condition of the possibility of experience, emphasizing the great gap between Kant and Husserl. In a next step I will investigate the shared distinction (in different terminology) of Kant's “Anschauungsvollzug” and the object on the one hand and Husserl's “Auffassungsakt” and “Auffassungsinhalt” on the other hand. Not only are there similarities between the Kantian synthesis of reproduction and the Husserlian retention, but there are similar notions of the possibility of experiencing duration, succession and simultaneity – with one major difference in the description of non-causal succession. Finally there is a strong equivalence on the level of time as the form of the inner sense in Kant and time as form of consciousness in Husserl’s analysis of Phenomenology of inner time-consciousness.
Lastly, I would suggest that one can read Kant in some aspects as a phenomenologist avant la lettre and in some aspects Husserl as a Postkantian. Certainly, there remain fundamental differences concerning method and axioms of their philosophy, but their philosophy of time brings them together more closely and sheds an inspiring light on both of their approaches.
Organisation
Florian Fischer (Siegen)
Florian Fischer (Siegen)
