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International Workshop
Tense and Tensibility
07 April 2017
Logic Library / University of Bonn
Tense and Tensibility
07 April 2017
Logic Library / University of Bonn
|
Nathália de Ávila (Bonn)
Florian Fischer (Bonn) Christian Loew (Luxembourg) Moritz Rathjen (Freiburg) |
The Ethical Time of Man as a Replicate of God's Conflictual Eternity - An Introduction to Schelling's "Ages of the World"
Towards a Dispositional Theory of Persistence Fundamentality and Time’s Arrow Do Tensed Truths Have Token-Reflexive Truth-Conditions? |
Program
|
13:00 - 14:00
14:30 - 15:30 16:00 - 17:00 17:30 - 18:30 |
Christian Loew - Fundamentality and Time’s Arrow
Moritz Rathjen - Do Tensed Truths Have Token-Reflexive Truth-Conditions? Nathália de Ávila - The Ethical Time of Man as a Replicate of God's Conflictual Eternity - An Introduction to Schelling's "Ages of the World" Florian Fischer - Towards a Dispositional Theory of Persistence |
Towards a Dispositional Theory of Persistence
Florian Fischer (University of Bonn)
The modern debate (following David Lewis) about persistence focuses on resolving the contradiction with Leibniz' Law of the indiscernibility of identicals: If two objects are identical, than they share all of their properties. But if an objects changes, it exemplifies different (even incompatible) properties, while staying identical. The contemporary accounts of persistence fall into two camps: Roughly, perdurantism time-indexes the object (temporal parts), while endurantism time-indexes the properties or the having of the properties. The question, how change is brought about is ignored, however. My account of dispositions understands manifestations as processes. I will present a theory of persistence, based on this account and sketch how it deals with the problem of persistence.
Florian Fischer (University of Bonn)
The modern debate (following David Lewis) about persistence focuses on resolving the contradiction with Leibniz' Law of the indiscernibility of identicals: If two objects are identical, than they share all of their properties. But if an objects changes, it exemplifies different (even incompatible) properties, while staying identical. The contemporary accounts of persistence fall into two camps: Roughly, perdurantism time-indexes the object (temporal parts), while endurantism time-indexes the properties or the having of the properties. The question, how change is brought about is ignored, however. My account of dispositions understands manifestations as processes. I will present a theory of persistence, based on this account and sketch how it deals with the problem of persistence.
Fundamentality and Time’s Arrow
Christian Loew (University of Luxembourg)
The distribution of matter in our universe is strikingly time asymmetric. Most famously, the Second Law of Thermodynamics says that entropy tends to increase toward the future but not toward the past. But what explains this time asymmetry in the distribution of matter? In this paper, I examine whether we get a deeper explanation of the time-asymmetric distribution of matter in our universe if we posit an intrinsic direction of time. I propose to understand this intrinsic direction of time in terms of metaphysical fundamentality and show that positing such a direction enables a deeper explanation of the time asymmetry of Thermodynamics than is available otherwise.
Christian Loew (University of Luxembourg)
The distribution of matter in our universe is strikingly time asymmetric. Most famously, the Second Law of Thermodynamics says that entropy tends to increase toward the future but not toward the past. But what explains this time asymmetry in the distribution of matter? In this paper, I examine whether we get a deeper explanation of the time-asymmetric distribution of matter in our universe if we posit an intrinsic direction of time. I propose to understand this intrinsic direction of time in terms of metaphysical fundamentality and show that positing such a direction enables a deeper explanation of the time asymmetry of Thermodynamics than is available otherwise.
Registration
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to fischerf@uni-bonn.de to let us know you are coming.
All participants are welcome, but please send a short email to fischerf@uni-bonn.de to let us know you are coming.
Organisation
Florian Fischer
Florian Fischer
