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International Workshop
It's a Matter of Time
10 - 11 May 2019
Dublin, Ireland
It's a Matter of Time
10 - 11 May 2019
Dublin, Ireland
Talks
Luca Banfi (Dublin) - What's Wrong with the Presentism/Eternalism Debate?
Naomi Corlett (Dublin) - Humeanism and the Open Future
Dan Deasy (Dublin) - A-Theories Post-Prior
Bahadir Eker (Tübingen) - Temporal Ontology vs. Temporal Ontogeny: Putting A-Theories into Perspective
Alison Fernandes (Dublin) - Why Do We Deliberate on the Future?
Florian Fischer (Siegen) - Persistence and the Interesting Kind of Stability
Cord Friebe (Siegen) - Future's Becoming Possible
Martin Pickup (Oxford) - Change and Reality's Fragmentation
Luca Banfi (Dublin) - What's Wrong with the Presentism/Eternalism Debate?
Naomi Corlett (Dublin) - Humeanism and the Open Future
Dan Deasy (Dublin) - A-Theories Post-Prior
Bahadir Eker (Tübingen) - Temporal Ontology vs. Temporal Ontogeny: Putting A-Theories into Perspective
Alison Fernandes (Dublin) - Why Do We Deliberate on the Future?
Florian Fischer (Siegen) - Persistence and the Interesting Kind of Stability
Cord Friebe (Siegen) - Future's Becoming Possible
Martin Pickup (Oxford) - Change and Reality's Fragmentation
Program
Friday, 10th May 2019
|
10:30 -11:30
11:45 - 12:45 14:15 - 15:15 15:30 - 16:30 17:00 - 18:00 |
Naomi Corlett (Dublin) - Humeanism and the Open Future
Cord Friebe (Siegen) - Future's Becoming Possible lunch break Florian Fischer (Siegen) - Persistence and the Interesting Kind of Stability Martin Pickup (Oxford) - Change and Reality's Fragmentation Alison Fernandes (Dublin) - Why Do We Deliberate on the Future? |
Saturday, 11th May 2019
|
09:00 - 10:00
10:15 - 11:15 11:30 - 12:30 12:30 - 13:00 |
Luca Banfi (Dublin) - What's Wrong with the Presentism/Eternalism Debate?
Bahadir Eker (Tübingen) - Temporal Ontology vs. Temporal Ontogeny: Putting A-Theories into Perspective Dan Deasy (Dublin) - A-Theories Post-Prior final discussion |
Venue
Friday venue: National University of Ireland, 49 Merrion Square (East), Dublin 2
Saturday venue: Room 5012, Arts Building, College Green, Trinity College Dublin (near the Nassau Street entrance)
Saturday venue: Room 5012, Arts Building, College Green, Trinity College Dublin (near the Nassau Street entrance)
Organisation
D. Deasy, A. Fernandes and F. Fischer
This workshop is organized by the ISPT (Irish Society for Philosophy of Time) in collaboration with SPoT (Society for Philosophy of Time)
D. Deasy, A. Fernandes and F. Fischer
This workshop is organized by the ISPT (Irish Society for Philosophy of Time) in collaboration with SPoT (Society for Philosophy of Time)
Abstracts
Persistence and the Interesting Kind of Stability
Florian Fischer (Siegen)
Things exist through time; they persist. Sometimes they change, sometimes they don’t. They persist through change and they persist through stability. Although this seems like a truism, the debate about persistence focus solely on persistence through change. And understandably so, since only change may lead to a contradiction: In a case of change one and the same entity exemplifies incompatible properties. But ontologically persistence through stability is as much explanation-worthy as persistence through change.
I argue that there are two kinds of stability. First there is idle stability. To put it bluntly, this is the case where somethings stays the same because nothing happens. This is the kind of stability that Newton’s first law speaks about. But besides this there is a second kind of stability, which I would like to call resulting stability. This is, arguably, the more interesting kind of stability: stability that is brought about.
The world seems to be full of resulting stability: human bodies persists by metabolism: a literal exchange of matter brings about a (roughly) stable, persisting body; social systems like an entire state often only persist by a delicate balance of internal and external forces; and even vast astronomical entities like a solar system only persist by a delicate equilibrium of rotation energy and gravitational pull.
Stability is often brought about by massive cooperation. This means that on one level we have stability and on another level a lot of things have to happen, to put it bluntly once again. In this regard resulting stability is a kind of change.
Florian Fischer (Siegen)
Things exist through time; they persist. Sometimes they change, sometimes they don’t. They persist through change and they persist through stability. Although this seems like a truism, the debate about persistence focus solely on persistence through change. And understandably so, since only change may lead to a contradiction: In a case of change one and the same entity exemplifies incompatible properties. But ontologically persistence through stability is as much explanation-worthy as persistence through change.
I argue that there are two kinds of stability. First there is idle stability. To put it bluntly, this is the case where somethings stays the same because nothing happens. This is the kind of stability that Newton’s first law speaks about. But besides this there is a second kind of stability, which I would like to call resulting stability. This is, arguably, the more interesting kind of stability: stability that is brought about.
The world seems to be full of resulting stability: human bodies persists by metabolism: a literal exchange of matter brings about a (roughly) stable, persisting body; social systems like an entire state often only persist by a delicate balance of internal and external forces; and even vast astronomical entities like a solar system only persist by a delicate equilibrium of rotation energy and gravitational pull.
Stability is often brought about by massive cooperation. This means that on one level we have stability and on another level a lot of things have to happen, to put it bluntly once again. In this regard resulting stability is a kind of change.
Future's Becoming Possible
Cord Friebe (Siegen)
According to presentism, the future does not exist, but the present is not the end of time. How does this work? My thesis is: Present’s becoming actual is Future’s becoming possible. I will explain this thesis (and argue for it) by considering (i) the presentist’s understanding of the relationship between temporal and modal notions, (ii) the presentist’s (best) way of rejecting the triviality objection against presentism, and (iii) the presentist’s (preferable) solution to the problem of change.
Cord Friebe (Siegen)
According to presentism, the future does not exist, but the present is not the end of time. How does this work? My thesis is: Present’s becoming actual is Future’s becoming possible. I will explain this thesis (and argue for it) by considering (i) the presentist’s understanding of the relationship between temporal and modal notions, (ii) the presentist’s (best) way of rejecting the triviality objection against presentism, and (iii) the presentist’s (preferable) solution to the problem of change.
